We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata introduced by Nowak and May [13] , in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that an individual needs to collect a score U above a threshold U min , representing vital resources (nutrients, energy, etc.). Thus agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the strategy of the most successful neighbour (who got U msn ), also take into account if U msn is above or below U min . Three different model variants are considered: (1) If U msn < U min an organism has a probability of adopting the strategy that is the opposite of the one used by its most successful neighbour; (2) similar to (1) but a cell can die leaving a vacancy (that in the subsequent step may be occupied by another organism); (3) the ordinary evolutionary recipe of copying the most successful neighbour supplemented with a Pavlovian "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. In all the cases the modifications allow the evolution of cooperation in payoff regions where defection was the rule for simple unconditional strategy players, as it happens when the difference between the punishment for mutual defection and the sucker's payoff is large. The cluster structure is analysed and, for one version of the model in a restricted region of the parameter space, we found power-law scaling for the cluster size distributions and perimeter vs. area curves.
Introduction
Cooperation among animals, either within or between species, is widespread throughout nature [1] - [6] . This presents a puzzle for Darwinists since, according to Darwin's theory, the rule among animals should be competition, not cooperation.
Attempting to understand the evolution of cooperation, Maynard Smith and Price [7] applied game theory to interactions between competing individuals of the same species that use different strategies for survival. They found that in situations like combat, in which each individual must decide whether or not to escalate the fight without knowing his opponent's decision, the interests of both combatants are best served if both decide not to escalate the fight.
2 × 2 games (2 players making a choice between 2 alternatives), which showed their usefulness in Economics and Social Sciences, consitute a basic tool to model the conflict/cooperation situations in Biology [8] .
In particular one of such games is the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), now well established as a useful tool for studying cooperative interactions among selfinterested agents. The PD game comes from an experimental setup designed by the researchers at the RAND Corporation M. Dresher and M. Flood. The game refers to an imaginary situation in which two suspects are arrested near the scene of a crime. The police don't have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. The two prisoners are held in separate cells and offered a deal: If one testifies implicating the other in the principal crime will go free, while the other, if remains silent, will receive 10 years in prison. If they both testify against each other, each will receive 5 years. Finally, if they both remain silent, they will both be convicted by a minor crime and serve one year. What's the rational choice for each prisoner? To remain silent (cooperate with your partner) or to confess (not to cooperate)? The "dilemma" faced by the prisoners is that, whatever the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have obtained if both had remained silent. This puzzle illustrates well a conflict between individual and group rationality. A group whose members pursue rational self-interest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self-interest. Formulated in its general form the PD game involves two players each confronting two choices: cooperate (C) or defect (D) and each makes his choice without knowing what the other will do. The possible outcomes for the interaction of both agents are: 1) they can both cooperate: (C,C) and get the "reward" for mutual cooperation R, 2) they can both defect: (D,D) and get the "punishment" for mutual defection or 3) one of them cooperates and the other defects: (C,D); in that case the one who played C gets the "sucker's payoff" S while agent who played D gets the "temptation to defect" T . The following payoff matrix summarizes the payoffs for row actions when confronting with column actions:
with the four payoffs obeying the inequalities:
T > R > P > S (1) and 2R > S + T.
(
Clearly it pays more to defect: if your opponent defects, and you cooperate you will end up with the worst payoff. On the other hand, even if your opponent cooperates, you should defect because in that case your payoff is T which is higher than R. In other words, independently of what the other player does, defection D yields a higher payoff than cooperation and is the dominant strategy for rational agents. Nevertheless, reasoning that way both agents get P which is worst than R.
A possible way out for this dilemma is to play the game repeatedly. In this iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), there are several strategies that outperform the dominant one-shot strategy [D,D] and lead to some non-null degree of cooperation. The tournaments organized by Axelrod [9] [10] in the 80s were very illuminating. He invited researchers from different fields to contribute a strategy, in the form of a computer program, to play the Prisoner's Dilemma against each other and themselves repeatedly. Each strategy specified whether to cooperate or defect based on the previous moves of both the strategy and its opponent. The programs were then ranked according to the total payoff accumulated. The winning program, was also the simplest: 'TIT FOR TAT' (TFT), which plays C on the first move, and on all subsequent moves copy the choice of its opponent on the previous move. In an ecological approach [11] , the scores from round two were used to calculate the relative frequencies of the strategies in a hypothetical population. The strategies were then submitted to each subsequent round in proportion to their cumulative payoff in the previous round. In the long run, TFT outcompeted its rivals and went to fixation. Axelrod and Hamilton [10] used these ecological competition between strategies as a basis for their analysis of the evolution of reciprocal altruism. This model is applicable in two opposite situations: On the one hand, in the case of higher animals, which can distinguish between their various opponents in order to reciprocate [12] . Otherwise an individual which met defection from one opponent would defect against others, and the result would soon be general defection. On the other hand, in the case of very simple organisms who have only one opponent in its lifetime.
Nowak and May [13] found another way to escape from the dilemma: the incorporation of territoriality in evolutionary game theory favours cooperation. The authors proposed simple cellular automata (CA) for general ecological systems involving undiscriminating organisms who play against several opponents (their neighbours). They neglected all strategical complexities or memories of past encounters considering a cellular automaton in which each cell is either in a C or D state and plays repeatedly with its neighbours. In the next generation, an individual cell adopts the state of the most successful cell of the neighbourhood (the one that collected the highest payoff among the cell itself and its neighbours). Coexistence of both states or behaviours were found for a simplified version of the PD in which the punishment P is equal to (or slightly greater than) the sucker's payoff S 1 , implying then a "weak dilemma" (maximum punishment). Taking R = 1 and P = S = 0 allows to parameterise the payoff matrix in terms of just one parameter T . Szabó and Töke [14] slightly modified this model with the addition of randomness: players are chosen to update their states randomly by copying the state of one of its neighbours with a probability depending on the payoff difference. They measured the fraction of cooperators c for different values of the temptation to defect T and found a continuous transition from c = 1 to c = 0 as T increases. A problem with these simple spatial games is that if P is augmented until it becomes comparable to the reward R (say P = 0.5 ) then cooperation disappears and all the individuals end playing D. Spatial evolutionary games involving more sophisticated players, with m-steps memory and strategies involving conditional probabilities, were studied by Lindgren and Nordahl [15] . They considered payoff matrices parameterised in terms of two parameters, T /R and P/R (S = 0), and found the evolution of cooperation for payoff matrices not restricted to "weak" dilemmas.
In the present work we analyse how the evolution of cooperation can be preserved even though when the punishment P is relatively soft (P >> S) for the simplest unconditional cellular automata i.e. agents using unconditional strategies 2 , without the ability to distinguish opponents, without long term memory, etc. The basic idea is that individuals need to collect, when playing with their z neighbours, a payoff above certain threshold U min in order to survive. In an ecosystem U min represents the minimal resources (nutrients, energy, etc.) without which organisms die. Thus, even though for the difference between P and S sufficiently large the most successful individuals are the ones who play D, when U min > z(P − S) they cannot survive surrounded by an entire neighbourhood of D's and some of them are replaced by C players. We use a normalized payoff matrix with R = 1 and S = 0. Besides the 3 parameters: U min , T and P we include a probability p for players of copying the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (depending if their utilities are above or below U min ). We explore a subspace of the space of parameters {T, P, U min , p} measuring the fraction of cooperators and quantities characterizing the cluster structure. We also discuss the different model variants and compare their results.
The model and its variants
The players, which are represented by cells of a two dimensional automaton, can follow only two unconditional strategies when playing with their neighbours: cooperate (C) or defect (D). In this work we restrict ourselves to a) the von Neumann neighbourhood (z = 4 neighbour cells: the cell above and below, right and left from a given cell) and b) the Moore neighbourhood (z = 8 neighbour cells surrounding a given cell). Typical grid sizes range from 50 × 50 to 500 × 500. Periodic boundary conditions are used. The total payoff of a given player is the sum of all the payoffs he gets against each neighbour. Tables 1 and  2 summarize the different payoffs for a player depending on the number of C's and D's in its neighbourhood (except for the case of the second model variant where the number of D agents is not the complement of the number of C's). The dynamic is synchronous: all the agents update their states simultaneously at the end of each lattice sweep. Table 1 payoff of a player depending on its state C(row 1) or D (row 2) and the number of C and D agents in its neighbourhood for the z = 4 case.
In the CA of ref. [13] natural selection is implemented very simply: each player adopts the strategy of the most successful neighbour (who got U msn ).
Here, we consider three different possible variants:
(1) Basic version: Conditional copying the most successful neighbour. Table 2 The same as Table 1 but for z = 8 neighbours.
If U msn > U min ,then the player adopts the strategy of the most successful neighbour in the next generation. Otherwise, the player has a small probability p of adopting the opposite strategy. The rationale for this is that copying the most successful neighbour, when its payoff doesn't reach a critical threshold, may not be the most efficient strategy from an evolutionary point of view.
(2) Version 1 + death of organisms
This variant includes the possibility of some cells remaining unoccupied. The rules are the same as above except that in the case when U msn < U min , instead of adopting the strategy of the most successful neighbour, the player dies with probability 1−p leaving an empty cell. An empty cell updates its state copying the one of its most successful neighbour with probability 1 − p and the opposite strategy with probability p. Finally, an empty cell surrounded by empty cells remains unoccupied in the next round.
(3) Hybrid version: natural selection complemented with a Pavlovian criterion A relevant input to produce an efficient behaviour update rule is the comparison of the individual payoff with U min . If it is above U min then the agent's behaviour may be worth keeping even if it is not the most successful in the neighbourhood. Then we implement this variant as follows: If U msn > U min there are two alternatives, depending whether the individual payoff U is above or below U min . In the former case the cell copies the state of its most successful neighbour with probability p (equivalently it remains in its state with probability 1 − p). In the latter case the cell does the opposite: it copies the state of the most successful neighbour with probability 1 − p (remains in its state with probability p). On the other hand, if U msn < U min the cell copies the opposite state of its most successful neighbour with probability 1 − p (otherwise remains in its state).
Therefore, this variant interpolates between the ordinary evolutionary recipe of copying the most successful neighbour adopted in [13] and the "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion of the game considered by Herz [18] .
Results
It turns out that, for the different variants of the model, the system reaches a steady state with a definite value c for the fraction of agents playing C after a transient. The duration of the transient depends on the lattice size and the neighbourhood. For instance for a 50 × 50 lattice and z = 8 it last typically between 100 and 200 rounds.
To avoid dependence on the initial conditions, the measures correspond to averages over an ensemble of 100 systems with arbitrary initial conditions.
Here, we present results for a subspace of the parameter space {T, P, U min , p}. We choose definite values for the punishment P and the probability parameter p, specifically: P = 0.5 3 and p = 0.1. The temptation parameter T is varied between 1 and 2. U min < zP has no effects; on the other hand U min > zT doesn't make sense since no one can reach this threshold. Thus, the parameter space reduces to the square plane T − U min delimited by 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and zP ≤ U min ≤ zT .
Frequency of cooperators
The asymptotic (after a transient) fraction of cooperator agents c was computed for a grid of points in the T -U min plane using lattices of relatively modest size: 50 × 50. Similar results hold for 100 × 100 lattices or bigger.
Figures 1.a and 1.b corresponding to the first model variant show a similar
dependence on frequency of cooperators with T and U min . Note that, when U min > zP , the fraction of cooperators raises from zero to a non negligible value regardless of the value of T 4 . The explanation of this is simple: a D agent surrounded by D's get a payoff zP that is below the surviving threshold, and thus has a probability p of becoming C in the next round. Basically three regions can be distinguished in the plots:
• A stepladder region emerges from the right border U min = zP .
• For not too large values of T and U min there is a high peak of cooperation, delimited at the left by U min = zR = z (when all the cells play C). • Finally, beyond U min = zR = z c reaches a plateau delimited by the straight line U min (T ) = zT (U min greater than zT is an unreachable score in the game we are considering). To understand the 3 different regions it is useful to consider a small deviation from the minimum T : T = 1 + ǫ. Therefore, for z = 8 and P = 0.5 the Table  2 becomes the Table 3 . Table 3 Same as Table 2 for T = 1 + ǫ, P = 0.5
Let's start with the peak. For U min greater than 6, only D's surrounded by at least 4 C's can achieve the minimum U min , so cooperation grows dramatically. This corresponds to ǫ < ∼ 0.16, (i.e. T < ∼ 1.16). When U min = 8 c drops abruptly since even C agents surrounded entirely by other C's cannot survive anymore.
The stepladder structure can be easily explained considering the payoff values for D agents shown in Tables 1 and 2. As long as U min increases each D agent needs more C agents in its surroundings in order to achieve the threshold. So cooperation grows with U min by steps at the values mentioned before: U min = T + 7P , U min = 2T + 6P and so on, which correspond to straight lines with different slopes in the (T, U min ) plane . Finally, when U min > 8T the minimum required is above any agent's possible score, then the fraction of agents C one time step further will be given by
where f D stands for the fraction of agents (C and D) whose most successful neighbour is a D and f C is the fraction of agents (C and D) whose most successful neighbour is a C. As none of the agents achieves the threshold, the state of all of them is updated with probability p to the opposite state to that of each one's most successful neighbour. For small values of p, f C ≈ 0 (since a C agent needs to be surrounded by a minimum number of C agents to be the most successful), f D ≈ 1 and finally c ≈ p. This explain why the height of the plateau coincides with the probability p 5 .
The landscape that emerges from the second model variant (see Fig. 2 .a and Fig. 2.b) is very similar to the one produced by the first variant. On the other hand, the hybrid model variant gives rise to dramatic modifications in the landscape shown in Fig. 3 .
Firstly, we observe a strong increase in c for all the parameter space surrounding the peak zone. In particular, note the height of the plateau and the steep formation. Secondly, most part of the plateau is replaced by steeply "cliffs".
For this version, when U min > 8T the equation 3 is replaced by Hence, in the steady state we have the solution c = f D .
Cluster structure
In this subsection we analyse the cluster structure and spatial patterns in the three different regions of the plane T − U min identified in the previous subsection. We restrict to the hybrid model for the z = 8 Moore neighbourhood, since this variant is the one that exhibits more clear cut results. In addition, this variant is the one that shows a greater richness in the c landscape (see Fig.  3 ). Hence we present the results from measures at four representative points in the T −U min plane: (a) [T =1.5,U min =11.9] belonging to the plateau (c ≃0.75), (b) [T =1.06,U min =6.9] belonging to the peak (c ≃0.91), (c) [T =1.2,U min =5.5] at the side of the peak (c ≃0.5) and (d) [T =1.6,U min =7.5] belonging to the stepladder region (c ≃0.4).
For [T =1.5,U min =11.9], although fraction of cooperators is stable the spatial patterns change constantly as a consequence of the transition rules. One of these patterns is showed in figure 4 .a For [T =1.06,U min =6.9], giant stable clusters dominate the lattice as expected from the high level of cooperation in that region as shown in figure 4 .b At the side of the cooperation peak there are spatial stable structures of clusters with a characteristic size as the ones of figure 4.c. When we move away from the peak into the region bounded between 2T + 6P and 3T + 5P scale invariance emerges: clusters of all size occur as can be seen from figure (4.d) for T = 1.6 and U min = 7.5. In this case we are in presence of constantly changing spatial patterns again. Histograms of the size distribution of clusters for the four above points in the T − U min plane are shown in figure 5 . Note that 5.d clearly shows a power law distribution with exponent −1.6357 ± 0.0001. Power laws are the signature of organisation into a critical state. It indicates that the system exhibits the highest pattern of diversity: there are few large structures and many smaller clusters. This power-law scaling emerges only for a very reduced region in the plane plane T − U min in the vicinity of the point [T = 1.6, U min = 7.5] 6 . In that sense this scale-free behaviour seems more to ordinary critical phenomena, where a fine-tuning of the control parameters is required, than to the much more robust self-organized criticality (SOC).
Besides the size distribution of clusters, the relationship between the perimeter and the area of the clusters provides useful information on their geometry. The area A of a cluster is the number of all connected cells with a given strategy (C or D) and its perimeter ℓ is defined as the number of cells that form its boundary (those cells of the cluster with at least one neighbour not belonging to it). We compute the mean perimeter ℓ(A) for a given area A averaging over all the perimeters of clusters with given area A. Plots of ℓ vs. A for the four T, U min points treated before are shown in figure 6.
For the case depicted in figure 6.d (which corresponds to a power law in size distribution as shown in figure 5 .d) the mean perimeter scales linearly with the area. So again we have for this region of the T − U min plane another power-law scaling. From this linearity it follows that the ratio of perimeter to interior becomes independent of the cluster size. The coefficient of the line ℓ(A) is 0.8369 ± 0.0001. which is much greater than the 0.5 expected for clusters with a regular geometry. This is an indicator of the ramified structure of clusters (see figure 4 .d).
Discussion
We have shown how cooperation among self-interested individuals can emerge from evolution in PD games, involving quite arbitrary payoff matrices, using the simplest possible agents: unconditional strategists, without long term memory and without distinguishing "tags". This allows the applicability of the model to a wide variety of contexts from natural to social sciences.
The main idea was to include the influence of the environment exerting pressure on individuals to cooperate even when the punishment for defecting is relatively soft. This is done by requiring a minimum score U min necessary for agents to carry on vital functions. This recipe works for arbitrary payoff matrices provided the threshold U min is grater than zP . An indication of the robustness of the model is that the three explored variants produce, qualitatively, the same main results. In particular, for moderate values of the temptation to defect T , there is an intermediate range of values of U min that maximises cooperation among self-interested agents producing a high peak of cooperators.
It is worth remaking that the supplementation of the ordinary evolutionary recipe of copying the most successful neighbour with a Pavlovian "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion has two relevant effects. The first is global optimisation i.e. it gives rise to a much higher cooperation level. The second is the emergence of power-laws in the size distribution and perimeter-size relationship for clusters of C agents. Power-laws were also found in a different study of cellu-lar automata playing the PD game with Pavlovian strategies [19] . However, in that case, this scaling behaviour is a much more robust result than the one we found here which holds only for quite reduced region in the T − U min plane.
To conclude, we envisage some future extensions of this model. For instance to explore the effect of heterogeneities, in the environment (a landscape dependent U min function) or in the agents (different payoff matrices, different types of individuals, etc.). In addition, the spatial networks observed in nature are in general not uniform square lattices like the ones considered here. So, another interesting direction that seems worth studying is to consider more realistic network topologies, for example scale free [20] or small worlds networks [21] .
